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son in order to make room for faith.
While I cannot agree with Hare's attempt to displace the line between
faith and knowledge, he makes an impressive case for returning this issue, as
well as the problem of the moral gap, and the question of the Christian roots
of Kant's ethics to prominence in philosophical and theological discourse.
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Analytic Theism, Hartshorne, and the Concept of God by Daniel A.
Dombrowski. State University of New York Press, 1996. Pp. xi, 247.
SEAMUS MURPHY, Milltown Institute of Theology and Philosophy
Process philosophy's approach to issues concerning the existence and
nature of God has not gained much acceptance from analytic theist philosophers. Daniel Dombrowski's book should go a considerable way towards
generating more interest among analytic philosophers and, hopefully, recti-
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tying that neglect. Taking the concept of God as the focal point, the author
presents Hartshorne's development of it in ways that are engagingly
addressed to the concerns and intuitions of classical and analytic philosophical theism. The author achieves his goal in large measure: at least, he has
made this reviewer more sympathetic to the process approach to God.
Dombrowski draws attention to the fact that, while the debates concerning the existence of God and the epistemological possibilities of reasoning
to it have been long and extensive, little attention has been paid to the
importance of conceptual issues concerning the nature of God. While there
was a period earlier in this century when positivistic emphasis on the verifiability criterion led to a debate as to whether words such as "God" could
have any meaning at all, that phase appears to be largely over, as a result
of its becoming apparent that the great bulk of our theoretic concepts
would also be jeopardized by that line of thought. Hartshorne's focus on
the concept of God has been to a different and more fruitful end.
As Dombrowski notes, the concept of God can be seen to be central to
the epistemological debates: determining whether God exists will typically
be affected by one's notion of what it is whose existence is in question. An
impassible and unchanging creator must, by virtue of those qualities, be
unrelated (except in an external, residual way) to his creatures. While
there are cogent philosophical reasons for holding such a concept of God, it
fits badly with the image presented in Judeo-Christian-Islamic revelation.
Monotheism presents God as intimately involved in human history, loving
all he has created, treating his rational creatures as free moral agents with a
capacity for knowledge of and perhaps friendship with their creator, and
hating evil and injustice.
In addition, the concept of an impassible God presents epistemological
difficulties: if one can't be related to God, so much the harder to claim even
the minimal involvement of knowing or being able to know that he exists.
The process approach makes it easier to make sense of the religious claim
that God's nature is partly relational and that in a certain sense God can
even be said to need us. While process philosophy is not beyond challenge,
it does have some strong cards to play in these areas. At the outset (pp. 89), the reader is introduced to Hartshorne's matrix of possible positions
with respect to God and the world being respectively necessary or contingent. Hartshorne's own position was that both necessity and contingency
are predicable of God and of the world. The claim that God, whose existence and most of whose properties are necessary, may have some contingent qualities is not unattractive since it accommodates the idea that God
can and does relate to us. The author deals with the reasons for rejecting
classical theism's view that God is not in any respect contingent, and shows
the desirability of ascribing certain attributes to God (such as the ability to
develop through relationship) which, while at variance with monotheism's
traditional view, we would find admirable in human beings.
On the other hand, the claim that the world is non-contingent in certain
respects is less attractive, since it removes God's freedom as regards choosing whether to create. This can perhaps be more accurately understood as
simply the claim that God's existence as cause makes a world of some sort
inevitable or necessary. However, the claim that some world necessarily
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exists does not entail the proposition that this world necessarily exists. It
was disappointing that the author did not clarify Hartshorne's reasons for
holding that this world must in some sense be necessary. The more attractive position where God is both necessary and contingent, and the world
purely contingent, is apparently not acceptable to Hartshorne and his followers, yet no reasons are given for not adopting it.
The first three chapters in this book are the most important, dealing
respectively with divine immutability, the commitments of Hartshornian
dipolar theism, and divine embodiment. As regards the first of these, the
classical assumption that it is better (or more perfect) to be unchanging
rather than developing, emotionally unaffected than experiencing emotion,
self-sufficient rather than related and hence dependent, is shown for what
it is: an assumption, with limited justification. Given the fact that our language about God is inevitably anthropomorphic to some extent, so that the
admirable or perfect qualities of God are human characteristics extrapolated ad infinitum and projected onto the divine, it seems reasonable enough
to suggest that they should be seen as context-dependent. Self-sufficiencey
is admirable in some contexts and not in others. In certain contexts, receptivity and sensitivity can surely be good-making or admirable qualities,
just as much as steadfastness and endurance in other contexts. While
receptivity and sympathy appear to make God contingent in certain
respects, there are good grounds for accepting this contingency as an
enrichment of our concept of God, a 'magnification' of the Lord.
Introducing contingency and relationality (to created reality) into God will
produce as well as solve philosophical problems; but every philosophical
option has some drawbacks.
Dombrowski does a good job of surveying the relevant literature for
comparative purposes, and of drawing together the main points in ways
that are helpful and informative. Thus, the views of Swinburne, Plantinga,
Alston, Creel, Gunton and others are discussed in ways that indicate the
different positions it is possible to hold on these matters. Making God contingent in certain respects is entailed in holding that God is affected sympathetically by his creatures, but this does not imply that God is in any
way inferior to anything or anybody else, or surpassable by anything other
than himself. The Hartshornian idea is that divine becoming can be more
inclusive, more all-embracing than divine being.
Chapter two, where the issue is whether Hartshorne's process philosophy can achieve a balance between God as active and God as receptive,
contains important material. In particular, he uses Plato's remark in the
Sophist (247e) that to be real is to have power, and to have power is to be
able to affect other things or be affected by them. If the disjunctive 'or' is
taken in an inclusive sense, it can be argued that part of the fullness of
being is to be receptive and capable of being influenced. There is a serious
question as to whether viewing God as a non-relational being does not, so
to speak, lessen God's fullness. One outcome of the process view is a more
favourable attitude to the idea that God acts by persuasion rather than by
compulsion. Critics tend to assume that this denies efficient causality to
God, with final causality masquerading as efficient causality. This too is
dealt with in an interesting way.
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The next chapter turns to the question of whether and in what sense God
can be said to be embodied, and uses the views of Swinburne for comparison. It is an enlightening treatment of a complex topic in a brief space. The
roots of Hartshorne's views are traced back to Plato, where the idea of God
as the World-Soul is first developed. The discussion of this point, making
clear how important Plato is to the process view of God, is stimulating.
Connections are also traced to figures such as Plotinus and Origen, and
similarities to some of Leibniz's ideas are also noted.
Hartshorne's panentheism commits him to the position that the world is
in some sense a part of God. One reason for holding this is to render
coherent the religious claim that God knows us, our world and our
predicament. Since these are contingent realities, and since knowledge
must be internal to the knower, that would make something contingent
internal to God. The arguments in support are presented clearly.
Objections to the claim that immateriality is entailed in perfection are treated at some length.
The claim that there must be a world if God is to be omnibenevolent was
not supported to any great extent; Swinburne's point that there is no overriding reason for God to make a universe is dismissed a little too quickly.
The assumption that God cannot be relational unless there is a material
universe with embodied beings for him to relate to seems forced; and the
brief remark (p. 89) in this context about the doctrine of the Trinity does
not do it justice, philosophically or theologically. In addition, the claim
that God's creation is not ex nihilo is an important point of difficulty which
should have been discussed. Chapters 4 and 5 are less important, since
they focus more on the views of other writers, such as William Alston, for
purposes of comparison to the process approach.
The final chapter, considering the implications of a process concept of
God for moral issues, was the weakest and least convincing. In the case of
abortion, I doubt if the classical (non-process) notion of God is a significant
causal factor leading Uto a misguided opposition to the moral permissibility of abortion" (p.6). In general, people's moral intuitions are rarely determined by their concept of God. In this instance, causal influence (if any) is
much more likely to run in the opposite direction, since people feel far
more passionately about the right to choose or the right to life than they do
about the appropriate concept of God.
Perhaps the value of the author's discussion of abortion is that it raises
questions about process philosophy's concept of personal beinK and identity; there seemed to be weaknesses on this point that were not apparent in
earlier chapters. The beauty of the Hartshornian concept of God was that it
seemed broad enough to be able to accommodate our intuitions about both
the substance and the process dimensions of God's being. Something similar is needed as regards the story of what it is to be a human being before
the insights of process theism can be applied to ethical theory. In addition,
the notion of process needs further clarification. While some processes are
simply processual, like the process of going bald, others are such that they
embed a determining event, e.g. the process of becoming pregnant. Any
application of process theism to issues of being a person or having personal identity, as well as to ethical issues, must deal with the latter kind of
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process. Ethical theory in particular cannot lightly take it that the notion of
process can replace the notions of event and act.

Reflections in the Mirror of Religion, by Ninian Smart. Edited by John P.
Burris. Macmillan/St. Martin's Press, 1997. Pp. xiii and 237. Cloth $45.00.
CHRISTOPHER KEY CHAPPLE, Loyola Marymount University
This work gathers several essays written and published by Ninian Smart
during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Ninian Smart, the 1998 President of
the American Academy of Religion, helped establish two premier departments of Religious Studies, at the University of Lancaster in England and at
the University of California, Santa Barbara. These essays contain reflections
on four decades of Smart's study and teaching of world religious traditions.
The editor, John Burris, has grouped these essays into three categories.
The first several essays probe the great metaphysical questions that undergird the study of world religions. What is the nature of religious experience? Can an experience of pure consciousness be achieved? Does the
mystic enter into a realm held in common with members of other faith traditions? The second group of essays explores the sociology of religion in
India and China for the past two hundred years. Smart discusses the differences between the South Asian and East Asian responses to colonialism
and seeks to explain the unqiue pespective of Theravada Buddhism, particularly in Sri Lanka. In the third and final section of the book, Smart examines practical issues pertaining to the study of religion at both the undergraduate and graduate levels, and ends on the optimistic note that interreligious understanding will help promote world peace.
Smart's philosophical approach to the study of religion might be characterized as liberal, open-minded, optimistic, pragmatic, and somewhat
perennialist. Though Smart has for decades worked at a full articulation of
the geographic and historical distinctions that set religious traditions apart
from one another, his analysis discerns two primary modalities of religious
thought. The first, and more common, asserts a transcendent presence that
determines and shapes the course of human life, at least in matters of ultimate concern. The Abrahamic Monotheisms Gudaism, Christianity, Islam)
fit this typology, as do Hinduism and certain strands of East Asian
thought, particularly as found in the moral absolutism of the Confucian
tradition and the cosmic Buddhahood of the Mahayana. However, according to Smart, Theravada Buddhism, with its negation of an abiding soul,
puts forth a model of religiosity that requires its own category. While not
exactly nihilistic, the Theravada nonetheless shows no interest in the pervasive theological concerns of the other traditions. By focussing on the
heroic control of the mind through ethical observances and meditation,
Theravada remains a reluctant partner for dialogue with other faiths
because of its reluctance to name as deity its concept of transcendence.
In discussing religion and modernity, Smart compares and contrasts
Maoist Marxism (which he considers to be religious) with the Neo-

